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NOTE

ROBINSON V. SHELL OIL CO.: POLICY-NOT
AMBIGUITY-DRIVES THE SUPREME COURTS DECISION
TO BROADEN TITLE VIrS RETALIATION COVERAGE
Before the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co.,' a majority of the circuit courts were blurring
seemingly unambiguous language to expand Title VII's coverage
to comport with amiable policy goals. Only policy justifications
could explain the courts' willingness to cover postemployment
retaliation based on language that prohibits an employer from
discriminating "against his employees"2 and that further defines employees as those persons "employed by an employer."3
Clearly, the plain meaning of such language envisions that
persons protected under Title VII have an existing employment
relationship with the covered employer at the time of the alleged retaliatory conduct. Yet, nearly all circuit courts addressing the issue before Robinson found the policy arguments more
compelling. In Robinson, the Supreme Court also found that the
amiable policy goals of extended coverage weighed more heavily
than the plain language of Title VIrs anti-retaliation provision.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This note deals with the conflict between competing interpretations of the scope of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

1. 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994).
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(Title VII)4 and the Supreme Court's resolution of that conflict

in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.' In Robinson, the Court was
squarely presented with the question of whether "former employees" are protected from postemployment retaliation by Title
VII. In 1977, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit became
the first to hold that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, in
section 704(a), protected former employees.6 By including former employees, i.e., those having no existing or on-going employment relationship with their former employer at the time of
the alleged retaliatory conduct, the court arguably extended
Title VII's coverage beyond that which Congress had envisioned
or intended. The Tenth Circuit relied primarily on two earlier
decisions' interpreting similar, but not identical, language in
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA).s This interpretation was adopted consistently by other circuits subsequently
addressing the issue, often with little or no independent analysis.9 Additionally, circuit courts interpreting identical anti-retaliation language in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (ADEA) ° adopted this rationale for protecting former
employees from postemployment retaliation. Thus, the ADEA's
scope with regard to postemployment retaliation became coextensive with that of Title VII. 11
In 1991, however, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit broke from the formerly unanimous interpretation. In Reed

4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
5. 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997).
6. See Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir.
1977).
7. See Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977); Hodgson v.
Charles Martin Inspectors of Petroleum, Inc., 459 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1972).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1994).
9. See Christopher v. Stouder Mem. Hosp., 936 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1991); EEOC
v. J.M. Huber Corp., 927 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1991); Sherman v. Burke Contracting,
Inc., 891 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1990); Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir.
1988); O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 670 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1982); Pantchenko v. C.B.
Dolge Co., Inc., 581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978). See also Todd Mitchell, Note, Terminate, Then Retaliate: Title VII Section 704(a) and Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 75 N.C.
L. REV. 376, 388 (1996) (noting the "brevity" of decisions extending Title VII coverage).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 631(c)(1) (1994).
11. See Passer v. American Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1991); EEOC v.
Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1987).
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v. Shepard,' the Seventh Circuit held that Title Virs anti-retaliation language did not cover former employees.' 3 A year
later, in Polsby v. Chase,4 the Fourth Circuit followed this
reasoning and refused to extend Title VIi's anti-retaliation
coverage to former employees. Other courts, however, remained
unpersuaded by this "narrow interpretation" and continued to
adopt and apply the majority view. 5 Courts downplayed the
significance of, or did not address at all, Title VII's statutory
language and definitions, opting instead to focus on broad policy
based considerations for protecting former employees. 6
In Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,' 7 the United States Supreme
Court was squarely presented with the issue and an opportunity to resolve the conflicting interpretations of section 704(a)'s
scope. Unlike earlier decisions construing the scope of Title
VII's anti-retaliation language, Robinson presented one of the
more troubling scenarios of alleged retaliation by a former employer, and consequently one of the strongest arguments to
include former employees within the protective veil of Title VII.
Opposition to the expansion of Title VII focused primarily on
the statutory language and other remedies available at common
law or alternative federal and state legislation. s Proponents of
expanding Title VII's coverage to the postemployment context
found strongest support in policy-based arguments.'9 In an ef12. 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
13. See id. Intimations of discontent with the expansive reading of section 704(a)

preceded Reed. In Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit panel
followed the majority view, but two members of the three judge panel concurred spe-

cially. See Sherman, 891 F.2d at 1536 (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring). Chief Judge
Tjoflat, writing for the concurrence, acknowledged that the panel was constricted by
principles of stare decisis to follow the prior Eleventh Circuit panel holding in Bailey
v. USX Corp., and therefore concurred in the judgment. See ia. He and Judge Atkins,
however, were "convinced that Bailey and the cases it relied upon for the result it
reached were wrongly decided." Id.
14. 970 F.2d 1360 (4th Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Polsby v.
Shalala, 507 U.S. 1048 (1993).

15. See Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 1994); EEOC v.
Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 1993).
16. See, e.g., Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 1994);
Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821
F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1987).
17. 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997).

18. See Respondents Brief at *11, Robinson, No. 95-1376, 1996 WL 419672 (U.S.
July 25, 1996).
19. See Sandra Tafuri, Note, Title VIrs Antiretaliation Provision: Are Employees
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fort to reach policy issues as a basis for decision, they argued
successfully that ambiguity in the use of the term "employee"
within Title VII required the Court to focus on the underlying
purpose of the Act.2" Alternatively, they argued that a literal
interpretation of the statutory language lead to absurd results,
and therefore justified the Court's reliance on the broad policies
embodied within Title ViI's language and remedial framework.2
In Part II, this note explores the facts of Robinson and other
postemployment retaliation scenarios. The note turns next to
the language of Title VII. Part III probes the language of section 704(a) and examines the definitions Congress provided in
section 701 of the Act. Additionally, it compares and contrasts
the language of section 704(a) with other Title VII provisions.
Part III also examines Congress' choice of language in subsequent legislation aimed at employees and former employees. As
will become evident, however, courts and commentators alike
have been seemingly less concerned with the actual scope of
Title Virs language, and this inquiry has been quickly subsumed by the question of whether Title VII should cover former
employees. Therefore, Part IV reviews the history of the judicial
expansion of section 704(a) and discusses the policy based arguments for and against extending Title VII coverage to
postemployment retaliation. Part IV also applies the various
arguments and alternatives to the facts of those cases that have
previously addressed the issue. It argues that most cases extending Title VII coverage could have been resolved with existing remedies and presented no basis for extending the Act's
plain language. Finally, based on this analysis and examination
of the facts in Robinson, Part V argues that including former
employees in section 704(a) was neither supported by Title VIs
Protected After the Employment Relationship Has Ended?, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 797
(1996).
20. See Petitioner's Brief at *7, Robinson, No. 95-1376, 1996 WL 341308 (U.S.
June 21, 1996); Patricia A. Moore, Note, Parting is Such Sweet Sorrow: The Application of Title WI to Post-Employment Retaliation, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 205, 211-18
(1993); Tafuri, supra note 19, at 810-16.
21. See Petitioner's Brief at *20, Robinson, No. 95-1376, 1996 WL 341308 (U.S.
June 21, 1996); James Francis Barna, Comment, Keeping the Boss at Bay, Post-Termination Retaliation Under Title VII: Charlton v. Paramus Board of Education, 47
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 259, 268-69 (1995); Tafuri, supra note 19, at 810-
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unambiguous language, nor required by public policy. Part V
also gives a synopsis of the Supreme Court's brief analysis in
Robinson, but concludes that the Court read ambiguity into
otherwise unambiguous language in an effort to achieve policy
goals. These goals, however amiable, were obviously not contemplated when Title VII was enacted, and have not driven
Congress to extend the statute's coverage in subsequent amendments.
The Supreme Court could not resist the temptation to judicially augment Title VIIs scope. This note will ultimately conclude that the Court's judicial extension of Title VII was unwarranted. This conclusion is not drawn from an unrealistic
presupposition that former employees need no protection after
participating in Title VII enforcement activities. Rather, it
merely recognizes the congressional intent inherent in the plain
language of section 704(a), and that the statute as narrowly
construed, together with existing common-law remedies, provides adequate protection against the threat of postemployment
retaliation.
In a policy-driven effort to provide a comprehensive scheme
of federal protection for aggrieved former employees, the Supreme Court has introduced new pitfalls and burdens on potential defendants and plaintiffs alike. The courts do not occupy
the advantageous position of Congress to appropriately study
and debate policy choices, nor should they be charged with this
task. Admittedly, there are legitimate policy rationales supporting an extension of Title VII coverage to postemployment retaliation, but Congress clearly did not intend to include former
employees in section 704(a). An expansion of federal employment legislation, if warranted at all, should have been left to
the legislature that initially created it. In Robinson, the Supreme Court chose to reject the protective scheme adopted by
Congress for one which it deemed a more logical and beneficial
means of deterring and remedying postemployment retaliation.
II. POSTEMPLOYMENT RETALIATION: ROBINSON AND RELATED
SCENARIOS OF DISCRIMINATION

Postemployment retaliation can be described as any action by
a covered employer taken against a former employee for the
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purpose of discriminating against the former employee because
of his or her participation in protected Title VII enforcement
activities.' Postemployment retaliation may take many forms.
The cases dealing with postemployment acts reveal a wide
array of retaliatory measures used by former employers to harass and malign former employees. Although the facts of these
cases differ, postemployment retaliation can be divided into two
broad categories: (1) "direct" retaliation; and (2) "indirect" retaliation, including employer to employer communications.
Direct postemployment retaliation includes employer actions
taken directly against the former employee. It may include
threats, intimidation, physical harassment, or abuse." It may
also include the suspension or termination of benefits over
which the employer has direct control.' Direct retaliation is
typically easy to identify and although retaliatory in nature, is
usually prohibited by other federal and state legislation.'
Thus, cases that deal with direct retaliation will be discussed
periodically throughout this note to demonstrate that the expansion of section 704(a) adds little additional protection in this
area. Indirect retaliation, however, is often more complex and
the expansion of Title VII's coverage may have a significant
impact in these cases.
Indirect retaliation involves actions by two or more employers, i.e., a former employer and prospective employer(s), and an
attempt to discern their latent motivations based on their actions.26 The focal point for inquiry under Title VII is the

22. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
23. See, e.g., Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991) (alleging retaliatory
measures included assault, phone threats, and shooting at plaintiffs vehicle).
24. See, e.g., Passer v. American Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (employer canceled symposium in honor of former employee after he filed charge); EEOC
v. J.M. Huber Corp., 927 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1991) (employer withheld benefit plan
funds from employees who challenged termination); EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d
1085 (5th Cir. 1987) (employer discontinued severance pay after former employee filed
charge).
25. See, for example, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
1001 to 1461 (1994), and generally state criminal and tort laws prohibiting assault,
battery, threats, defamation, and interference with contract. But see infra notes 22635 and accompanying text (discussing the likelihood that the plaintiff in Passer had
no recourse unless the court expanded section 704(a) to accommodate his claim).
26. See, e.g., Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1990)
(alleging former employer persuaded current employer to discharge employee for that
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employer's motive in providing or refusing to provide information, regardless of the truth or falsity of the information involved. Certainly the falsity of a reference and the negligence,
recklessness, or maliciousness with which the falsehood was
disseminated may indicate an employer's motive, but under
Title VII an employer's decision even to furnish truthful and
accurate information about an employee could be the basis of
liability if the employer intended to discriminate by furnishing
such information.' In this respect, enlarging the scope of Title
VII coverage will expand liability beyond current common-law
remedies for defamation and will force employers to reevaluate
the prudence of providing references. The facts of Robinson
illustrate the new quandary for employers.
In Robinson, the plaintiff, Charles T. Robinson (Robinson)
asserted that his former employer, Shell Oil Company (Shell)
gave a negative reference to a prospective employer because
Robinson had filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).' Robinson was discharged by
Shell in 1991. He subsequently filed a charge with the EEOC
alleging that his discharge was motivated by race. Robinson
then sought employment with Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Metropolitan). Metropolitan requested a reference from
Shell, which Shell provided. Robinson alleged that Shell provided a negative reference to Metropolitan because Robinson had
filed the earlier racial discrimination charge with the EEOC.
Shell's reference to Metropolitan occurred after Robinson had
been terminated and Robinson argued that it constituted
postemployment retaliation in violation section 704(a). Shell
conceded that the information it provided concerning Robinson's
performance was negative, but contended the information was
true and responsive to Metropolitan's inquiry. '

employee's participation in charge against former employer); Bailey v. USX Corp., 850
F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1988) (alleging that employer made disparaging comment to prospective employer); Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., Inc., 581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978)
(refusing to provide reference to prospective employer); Rutherford v. American Bank
of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1977) (advising prospective employer that
plaintiff had filed sex discrimination charge).
27. See Rutherford, 565 F.2d at 1164.
28. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843, 845 (1997).
29. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct.
843 (1997). See also Respondents Brief at *5, Robinson, No. 95-1376, 1996 WL
419672 (U.S. July 25, 1996) for a more detailed account of the factual setting.
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III. SECTION 704(A): LINGUISTIC CONTORTIONS TO INCLUDE
FORMER EMPLOYEES
Title VII's retaliation prohibition is contained in section
704(a).30 That section provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment... because he has opposed any practice, made an unlawful employment practice by this title, or
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this title."'
This language prohibits an employer from retaliating against
"any of his employees"32 for that employee's participation in
enforcing the substantive provisions of Title VII. The substantive provisions relating to covered entities (i.e., employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations) are contained in
section 703 of the Act.' Additionally, both "employer"' and
"employee"' are defined for the purposes of Title VII in section 701 of the Act. Before addressing section 704(a)'s scope
relating to former employees, it is helpful to note its general
contours, its breadth, and its limitations.
A.

The "Retaliation"Prohibition

As an initial matter, it should be noted that "retaliation7 is a
shorthand description of the anti-discrimination language contained in section 704(a). While it does provide an effective
method of distinguishing the focus of the prohibitions contained
in section 704(a) from the substantive provisions found in section 703, the shorthand is not entirely accurate. Although retal-

30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
31. Id.
32. Id (emphasis added).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994). "The term 'employer' means a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks." Id.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994). 'The term 'employee' means an individual employed by an employer." Id.
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iation is commonly used to describe conduct prohibited by section 704(a), the term "retaliation" is not used anywhere in Title
VII. Moreover, section 704(a) not only prohibits typical retaliatory conduct, or retribution by an employer for charges filed
against it by a current employee, but also, more broadly encompasses any discrimination against an employee because of that
employee's participation in protected Title VII enforcement
activities."
Section 704(a) also protects "applicants for employment."37
Consistent with this protection, the Act prohibits a prospective
employer from discriminating against an applicant for that
applicant's prior or current participation in enforcement proceedings against a former employer or other covered entity.38
Thus, section 704(a) is much broader than its "retaliation"
shorthand indicates. Meaningful discussion of the section's
scope and the purported impact of its expansion requires awareness of this breadth. Likewise, it requires careful scrutiny of
the section's inherent limitations.
Proponents of expanding section 704(a) extol the goals of
Title VII as a comprehensive remedy for employment discrimination, but section 704(a) does not, by its terms, attempt to
prohibit the entire universe of discrimination or retaliation in
the employment relationship. Rather, section 704(a) declares it
an unlawful employment practice to discriminate because of a
protected individual's opposition to Title VII violations or participation in an "investigation, proceeding, or hearing" relating to
such violations. 9 Discrimination on other bases is prohibited
by other substantive sections of the Act,' as well as other federal legislation.41 Section 704(a), like the Act itself, has recog36. See 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-3(a) (1994) (stating protected activities include opposing
any practice made unlawful under Title VII such as making a charge, testifying,
assisting or participating in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing).

37. Id.
38. See Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d 1360, 1365 n4 (4th Cir. 1992), vacated on
other grounds sub nom Polsby v. Shalala, 507 U.S. 1048 (1993); Christopher v.
Stouder Mem. Hosp., 936 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1991).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
40. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination because of race,

color, religion, sex, or national origin).
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(b) (1994) (FMLA); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), § 12132 (1994)
(ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994) (ADEA); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994) (Rehabilitation Act
of 1973); 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994) (Equal Pay Act of 1963); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
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nized limitations and is not the "cure-all" for every ill encountered in the employment relationship. Within these margins,
however, section 704(a) seeks to prevent discriminatory and
retaliatory conduct against protected individuals.
B. Making the "Former Employee" an "Employee" for Section
704(a) Purposes
One premise for including "former employees" within the
protection of section 704(a) is the purported ambiguity of the
statutory language. Because of this ambiguity courts are free to
rely on the policy objectives underlying the Act to guide their
decisions and can grant the language a broad interpretation to
further those goals.42 This argument focuses on a seemingly
inconsistent use of the term "employee" throughout Title VII
and Congress' failure to expressly exclude former employees
from section 704(a). This threshold finding of ambiguity in the
term "employee" formed the basis of the Court's decision in
Robinson.'
1. Defining an "Employee"
Facially, section 704(a) appears clear, prohibiting discrimination by an employer against "his employees or applicants for
employment."' Section 701(f) further provides that an "employee" is a person "employed by an employer."' In fact, the
Robinson Court prefaced its ultimate finding of ambiguity by
admitting that "[a]t first blush, the term 'employees' in [section]
704(a) would seem to refer to those [persons] having an existing
employment relationship with the employer in question.' The
Court, however, seized on the lack of a temporal qualifier that
would plainly establish section 704(a) protects only persons still

42. See Petitioner's Brief at *7, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., No. 95-1376, 1996 WL
341308 (U.S. June 21, 1996); Tafuri, supra note 19, at 806-08. See also infra Part IV
(discussing whether including or excluding former employees would further Title VIrs
underlying policies).
43. See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 848.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994) (emphasis added).
46. Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 846. Accord Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter., 117
S. Ct. 660 (1997).
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employed at the time of the alleged retaliation.4' The Court
concluded that the absence of a temporal qualifier left the term
ambiguous and open to interpretation.'
The Court also dismissed the significance of the qualification
that section 704(a) only prohibits an employer's discrimination
against "his employees."4 9 Section 704(a) does not define the
protected class as "employees" generically, but as "his employees" referring obviously to the employer perpetrating the discrimination.' Admittedly, this qualifier "narrows the scope of
the provision."5 ' Yet, the Court still found the term "could include 'his' former employees, but still exclude persons who have
never worked for the particular employer being charged with
retaliation."5 2 In its brief discussion of this qualification, it is
apparent that the Court rejected the plain connotation of the
qualifying term because it was linguistically possible to read
alternative meanings into the phrase.5 3
Finally, the Court found that the definition of "employee"
contained in section 701(f) also lacked a temporal qualifying
5 5 the
term.' In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden,
Court had criticized a similar definition of "employee" in the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act as a tautology which
explained very little.5 6 Despite its simplicity, the definition arguably remained open to multiple interpretations including both
present and past employees.57 The Robinson Court found that

47. See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 846. According to the Court, "his employees" is
ambiguous absent a qualifier such as "his 'current' employees." Id
48. See iUL
49. See id at 847-48.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
51. Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 847-48.
52. Id. at 848.

53. See id.
54. See id at 846-47.
55. 503 U.S. 318 (1992).

56. See id. at 323 (focusing on the similar definition of 'employee' in ERISA and
concluding that it is "completely circular and explains nothing"). The ERISA definition
provides that an employee is "any individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.C. §
1002(6) (1994). But see Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 1995)

(stating general rule that "a definition which declares what a term means ... excludes any meaning that is not stated" (quoting 2A GEORGE SUTHERLAND, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.07, at 152 (5th ed. 1992)), rev'd, 117 S.Ct. 843
(1997).
57. As the petitioner in Robinson argued, "employed' is both the past and present
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a broad interpretation was further supported by the inconsis-

tent usage of "employee" throughout Title VII.
2. Inconsistency Invites the Court to Find Ambiguity
There are numerous instances throughout Title VII, where
"employee" must be interpreted to encompass different combinations of present, former, and future employees. 5 For example,
sections 706(b) and 709(e) restrict employees of the EEOC from
disclosing information to the public.59 This prohibition should
logically extend to former employees of the agency in order for
these sections to completely prevent the unauthorized dissemination of information. Therefore, "employee" in the context of
sections 706(b) and 709(e) most likely encompasses former
employees as well as current ones.6 ° Similarly, sections
706(g)(1) and 717(b) provide for the "reinstatement or hiring of
employees" as remedies. 6 In Robinson, the Court found that
because an employer does not "reinstate" or "hire" an existing
employee, reinstatement necessarily refers to former employees
and hiring refers to prospective employees even though Title
VII uses "employee" rather than "individual" to refer to the
recipients of these remedies." The concept of "employee" with-

tense, passive voice and the past tense, active voice of the verb 'employ." Petitioner's
Brief at *17, Robinson, No. 95-1376, 1996 WL 341308 (U.S. June 21, 1996). Thus, the
language could refer to individuals who may be employed, are employed, or have
been employed. See id. at *18 n.10.
58. Robinson and the Amici pointed out the inconsistent use of the term 'employee" throughout Title VII. See Petitioner's Brief at *13-17, Robinson, No. 95-1376,
1996 WL 341308 (U.S. June 21, 1996); Amicus Brief of The Lawyers' Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law et al. at *10, Robinson, No. 95-1376, 1996 WL 341297 (U.S.
June 21, 1996); Amicus Brief of United States and The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at *10, Robinson, No. 95-1376, 1996 WL 346815 (U.S. June 21,
1996). The Court noted, however, that the term may have a specific usage within section 704(a) that would give it a single plain meaning within the particular context of
that section. See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 847.
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994) (prohibiting officers and employees of the
EEOC from disclosing conciliation efforts to the public); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1994)
(prohibiting any officer or employee of the EEOC from disclosing any information
related to an investigation or proceeding under Title VII, and providing that any officer or employee making such a public disclosure shall be guilty of a misdemeanor).
60. See Petitioner's Brief at *14, Robinson, No. 95-1376, 1996 WL 341308 (U.S.
June 21, 1996).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b) (1994).
62. See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 847. But see Respondent's Brief at *22, Robinson,
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in Title VII could not always, however, include former and/or
future employees.'
Employers covered by Title VII are defined by the scope provision in section 701(b) as those having "fifteen or more employees." Congress could not have intended to include many, if
not most, small employers under the Act by requiring that they
count all present and past employees in reaching this threshold.6" This would clearly contravene Congress' intent to exclude
small businesses from the scope of Title VII. In fact, in
Walters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc.,67 the
Court held that "the ultimate touchstone" in determining the
number of employees employed by an employer is the presence
of an "employment relationship" on the day in question."
Thus, the term "employee" in section 701(b) does not include
former employees. In Robinson, however, the Court found that
the temporal qualifiers used to define an "employer" in section
701(b) significantly differentiate it from definition of an "employee" in section 701(f).69 Therefore, the Court concluded that

even though an "employee" must have an existing employment
relationship to be counted for section 701(b) purposes, he need
No. 95-1376, 1996 WL 419672 (U.S. July 25, 1996) (arguing that employee in the
context of sections 706(g)(1) and 717(b) need not encompass past and future employees, because at the time of the adverse employment action (discharge or failure to
hire) the affected individual was an employee or applicant for hire, and thus, covered
under the act and entitled to such relief).
63. See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 847 (discussing the term "employee? in the context of sections 703(h) (standards of compensation for employees in different locations)
and 717(b) (promotion of employees) and concluding that in these sections the term
unambiguously refers only to current employees).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
65. See Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter., 117 S. Ct. 660 (1997).
66. See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that
the cost "associated with defending against discrimination claims [and complying with
federal regulations] was a factor in the decision to implement a minimum employee
requirement"); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that "Congress did not want to burden small entities with the costs associated
with litigating discrimination claims").
67. 117 S. Ct. 660 (1997).
68. 117 S. Ct. at 666. Walters was argued before the Court on November 6, 1996,
the same day as Robinson.
69. See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 846 n.2. Compare the temporal qualifiers in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining "employer' as "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty
or more calendar weeks . . . ") with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (defining "employee" as "an
individual employed by an employer").
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not have an existing relationship to be protected from retaliation under section 704(a). °
Differences in the use of "employee" throughout Title VII to
encompass various combinations of individuals compels the
conclusion that the term has no inherent singular meaning."
Many words have multiple meanings, however, and this fact
alone does not necessarily mean that the term in the section
704(a) context is ambiguous or that it requires a broad reading.72 Even in light of the foregoing examples of inconsistent
usage, the Robinson Court suggested that within Title VII "the
term 'employees' may have a plain meaning in the context of a
particular section."7' Thus, although "employee" was not used
as a term of art consistently throughout Title VII, it should be
read in a light consistent with "its surroundings ...
in the
statute where it appears."' The Court then considered the
context in which "employee" is used within section 704(a) to
determine whether this context provided any further meaning.75
3. Express Protection for Employees and Applicants Implicitly
Excludes Former Employees
The canon of statutory construction expressio unius est
exclusio alterius76 suggests a construction of section 704(a) that

70. See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 846-47.
71. But cf BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1771 (1994) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (stating that a "common rule of construction calls for a single definition of a common term occurring in several places within a statute"); Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 159 (1993) (stating
that "filt is a 'normal rule of statutory construction! that identical words used in
different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning").
72. See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 847.
73. Id.
74. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944) (quoting United States
v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940) (interpreting scope of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA)).
75. The Court rejected Robinson's argument that common usage and judicial interpretations of "employee" from other statutes should persuade the Court to give it a
similar interpretation in the Title VII context. See Petitioner's Brief at *9-13, Robinson, No.95-1376, 1996 WL 341308 (U.S. June 21, 1996). The Court found these interpretations "largely irrelevant" as to Congress' use of the term in section 704(a). Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 847 n.4.
76. Roughly translated as: "The expression of one thing implies the exclusion of
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does not include former employees." Section 704(a) explicitly
provides coverage for employees and applicants for employment.
It does not expressly provide coverage for former employees.
Thus, the statutory language expressly covers existing employment relationships and prospective relationships, but not former
ones. It is unclear why Congress would not also expressly include former employees, or past relationships, among those in
the protected class if it had intended to cover them.
Throughout Title VII Congress has used "employee" to describe several different temporal combinations of employment
relationships.7 ' Therefore, since "employee" is not a term of art
used consistently throughout Title VII, Congress could not have
relied on a uniform interpretation of the term to implicitly include former employees in section 704(a).7 9 Moreover, it is obvious from subsequent legislation that Congress is aware of the
temporal variations along the employment continuum and has
taken steps to expressly include former employees within the
scope of statutes where it consciously intended to cover them.
In those instances, despite language that otherwise included
"employees" generically, Congress saw fit to expressly include
"former employees." In the Congressional Accountability Act of
1995,80 The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989,81 The Interanother." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
77. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 188 (1978) (finding that
where Congress is aware of the broad sweep necessary to accomplish its purpose, the
inclusion of some exceptions within a statute, mandates finding that those not included were not intended to fall within the statute's scope). Accord California Coastal
Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 600 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). But see SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344,
350-51 (1943). Referring to the maxim the Court stated:
However well these rules may serve at times to aid in deciphering legislative intent, they long have been subordinated to the doctrine that
courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose, will read text in light of context and will interpret
the text so far as the meaning of the words fairly permits so as to carry
out in particular cases the generally expressed legislative policy.
Id. See also 2A NORIMAN J. SINGER, SuTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 47.23-47.25 (5th ed. 1992) (discussing the application of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius).
78. See supra Part H.B.2.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66 (suggesting that "employee" could
not possibly include former employees in the context of section 701(b), because it
would contravene Congress' intent to exclude small businesses).
80. 2 U.S.CA. § 1301(4) (West Supp. 1996) (stating that the "term 'employee'
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nal Revenue Code, 2 The Federal Credit Union Act," The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act," and The Occupational Safety and Health Act' Congress expressly covered "former employees." Absent express language in section 704(a), the
courts should not draw an inference that Congress' implicitly
intended to cover former employees where it expressly provided
for applicants and current employees, but failed to provide for
individuals who no longer have an existing employment relationship with the employer." This argument is significantly
strengthened by the express language Congress chose to cover
former employees in the statutory definitions reported above.
Moreover, even with the sweeping amendments to Title VII in
The Civil Rights Act of 1991,87 the language of section 704(a)
remained without any reference to former employees.' Admittedly, this final observation about Congress' failure to expressly
include former employees in subsequent amendments to Title
VII is a double-edged sword.

includes an applicant for employment and a former employee").
81. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1212(a)(1) (stating that the statute "shall protect employees, former employees and applicants for employment from prohibited personnel practices),
1213(a)(3), 1214(a)(3) & 1221 (1994) (protecting employees, former employees, and
applicants for employment).
82. 26 U.S.C. §§ 79(e) (stating that "for the purposes of this section the term
'employee' includes a former employee"), 5000(b) (1994) (stating that the section covers
"employees, former employees . . . [and] others associated or formerly associated with
the employer").
83. 12 U.S.C. § 1790b(b) (1994) (granting a right of action to any "employee or
former employee" for discrimination against such person for providing information to
Board or Attorney General regarding violations of law or regulations).
84. 12 U.S.C. § 1831j(b) (1994) (granting a right of action to any "employee or
former employee" for discrimination against such person for providing information to
Board or Attorney General regarding violations of law or regulations).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 657(c)(3) (1994) (providing each employee or former employee with
access to records of exposures to potentially toxic materials or harmful agents).
86. See Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527, 1540 n.6 (11th Cir.
1990) (TIjoflat, C.J., specially concurring). That
Congress specifically referred to 'applicants for employment' in addition to
'employees' makes it unlikely that Congress intended the term 'employee'
to be interpreted to cover former employees; if Congress wished the statute to reach former employees, it could have simply used words to that
effect, as it did with respect to job applicants.
Id. Accord Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d 1360, 1365 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating "Congress
could certainly have included a former employee if it had desired"), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Polsby v. Shalala, 507 U.S. 1048 (1993).
87. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 § 105(b).
88. See Tafuri, supra note 19, at 817-18.

1997]

ROBINSON V. SHELL OIL CO.

489

In light of the courts' unanimous interpretation of section
704(a) prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Congress may have felt no particular need to amend the section
to expressly cover former employees.8 9 On the contrary,
"[w]hile legislative inaction may not conclusively reflect legislative intent, one may reasonably infer that a Congress that
enacted civil rights legislation affecting the very provision in
question as recently as five years ago would have corrected
such a widespread misapprehension-especially if it intended to
exclude former employees." The Court has looked favorably
on Congress' implicit ratification of judicial interpretations in
the past.9 ' Yet, the focus in determining Title Vii's intended
scope should not be whether Congress has acted to exclude former employees in response to the courts' misinterpretations, but
rather whether it ever envisioned covering them when Title VII
was created.9 2
Title VII has no legislative history that clarifies Congress'
intent regarding former employees.93 In Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce," the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected an argument that former employees were not protected
by section 704(a) because a literal reading "would result in a
narrow interpretation of the statute not justified by its legislative history." 5 The court, however, failed to cite any history in
support of its expansive interpretation.9 6 As courts after Ruth89. See Christopher v. Stouder Mem. Hosp., 936 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding
former employees within protected class of section 704(a)); EEOC v. J.M. Huber
Corp., 927 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1991) (same); Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891
F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1990) (same); Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir.
1988) (same); O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 670 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1982) (same);
Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., Inc., 581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978) (same); Rutherford
v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 1977) (same).
90. Mitchell, supra note 9, at 399.
91. See 2B NoRMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CoNsTRucTION §49.09 (5th ed. 1992). In discussing "implicit ratification," Singer suggests that

where Congress reenacts a statute without changing language that has been judicially
construed Congress knows and approves of prior judicial interpretations. See id.
92. See Udi (stating that the "acquiescence of the legislature seems to be of small
consequence where the statute or its contemporaneous interpretation was not called to
the attention of the legislature" and the legislature's awareness is not evident from
committee reports or other legislative history pertaining to the reenactment).
93. See Moore, supra note 20, at 210 (concluding that Title VIrs "legislative history provides no guidance").
94. 565 F.2d at 1165 (10th Cir. 1977).
95. Id at 1165.
96. See iU. (citing no legislative history suggesting Congress intended to include
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erford have suggested, Congress did elaborate on section
704(a)'s purpose,97 but remained silent about its scope.9"
In Robinson, the Supreme Court also rejected the argument
that the express coverage of employees and applicants for employment implicitly excluded former employees. The Court determined that "[t]he use of the term 'applicants' in [section]
704(a) does not serve to confine, by negative inference, the
temporal scope of the term 'employees."'99 The Court found
that such a conclusion must be based on the premise that "the
term 'applicants' is equivalent to the phrase 'future employees. ' " ° Although the Court correctly determined that the
term "applicants" is much broader than "future employees," it is
unclear why the Court constructed this prerequisite determination before applying a common canon of statutory interpretation.' O' The negative implication would certainly be stronger if
Congress included one classification of individuals (e.g., future
employees) and failed to include a nearly identical distinct
classification (e.g., former employees), but Congress' recognition
that a single term could not encompass all of the individuals
that it intended to cover and its subsequent choice to expressly
include some individuals while not including others does not
completely negate the force of that choice.
Congress' choice to expressly cover both applicants and employees, but not former employees, is one of the strongest indications that Congress did not intend to provide these individuals with a private right of action. The Court's suggestion that
"[b]ecause the term 'applicants' in [section] 704(a) is not synonymous with the phrase 'future employees,' there is no basis for
engaging in the further (and questionable) negative inference
that inclusion of the term 'applicants' demonstrates intentional

former employees).
97. See 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (Interpretive Mem. of Sen. Clark & Sen. Case).
98. See Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d at 1540 n.6 (11th Cir.
1990) (TIjoflat, C.J., specially concurring).
99. Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 848.
100. Id.
101. The Court found that the term "applicants" could cover unsuccessful applicants or those who turn down offers, but neither would necessarily be "future employees." Moreover, the Court stated that "applicants" fails to cover "'uture employees'
who may be offered and will accept jobs without having to apply for those jobs." Id
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exclusion of former employees" defies logic and reason.' 2 The
Court's construction of a threshold requirement that all included and excluded classifications of individuals need to have identical parameters before invoking a common canon of statutory
construction has no basis in the canon itself or its previous
use." Thus, the Court's analysis should be viewed as an attempt to conveniently avoid the clear import of Congress' choice
to expressly include only some individuals.
4. Comparison of Sections 703 and 704(a) Suggests A Narrow
Interpretation
Comparison of section 704(a)'s language with other sections of
Title VII should provide guidance in construing "employee" in
this specific context. Congress used different language to define
the scope of the relevant protected classes in section 703 and
section 704(a) which suggests that it has prohibited different
types of discrimination against different categories of persons in
those sections.' While section 703 uses broad language to

102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 188 (1978).
104. Section 703 contains the substantive provisions of Title VII, prohibiting discrimination "on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-2 (1994). The prohibitions contained in section 703 define a broad protected
class of individuals. Likewise, section 704(a) prohibits retaliation by employment

agencies and labor organizations against any individual, but confines the class of
persons protected from employer realization to employees and applicants for employment. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) (prohibiting an employer from discriminating in hiring or termination "againstany individual" and from limiting, segregating, or classifying "his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities") and 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1994) (prohibiting an employment agency from discriminating
"against any individual" or classifying or referring "any individual") and 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(c) (1994) (prohibiting a labor organization from discriminating "against any
individual"; from limiting, segregating, or classifying its membership or applicants for
membership "in a way which would deprive any individual of employment opportunities"; and from causing or attempting "to cause an employer to discriminate against
an individual") and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1994) (prohibiting any employer, labor
organization, or joint labor-management committee from discriminating "against any
individual") with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994) (prohibiting an employer from discriminating against "any of his employees or applicants for employment") (emphasis added).
Note also that although protection from retaliatory conduct of employers, employment
agencies, and labor organizations is all contained in section 704(a) (rather than subdividing protection for each covered entity as in section (703)), section 704(a) uses the
above described dichotomous language in defining the protected classes. "Employees
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prohibit discrimination against "any individual," section 704(a)
prohibits an employer's discrimination only against "employees
and applicants for employment."'05 Section 704(a) therefore,
should be construed as covering a more narrow class of persons
than its broader counterparts in section 703.
In Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., Inc.,' the court reasoned
that the use of the term "individual" when referring to discrimination by prospective employers, employment agencies, and
labor organizations was appropriate because no employment
relationship existed between these entities and the protected
persons." Likewise, the court found that the term "employee"
was appropriate for prohibiting discrimination by employers
where an employment relationship existed or had at one time
existed.' 8' The court concluded that "use of the term
'employee' in referring to a former employee, while colloquial, is
not inappropriate." 9 Moreover, the court found that the term
did not indicate an intent by Congress to limit the scope of
section 704(a)'s protected class. This reasoning may sufficiently
explain the difference in language between section 704(a) and
sections 703(b) and 703(c), which relate to employment agencies
and labor organizations. It does not, however, account for the
different terms in sections 704(a) and 703(a), both of which apply to employers.
In Robinson, the Court also rejected the section 703 / section
704(a) comparison and determined that it provided "no meaningful assistance.""' The Court admitted that "'individual' is a
broader term than 'employee' and would facially seem to cover
a former employee," but it would also cover "persons who have
and applicants" are protected from the retaliation of employers, and "individuals" are
protected from the retaliation of employment agencies and labor organizations. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
105. See Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527, 1539 (11th Cir. 1990)
(Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring) (noting "contrast between the open-ended language
of section [703(a)] and the limiting terminology of section [704(a)]"); see also
Respondent's Brief at *15, Robinson, No. 95-1376, 1996 WL 419672 (U.S. July 25,
1996) (arguing that had Congress intended the scope of section 704 to be coextensive
with 703 it would have used identical language (i.e., "individual")).
106. 581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978).
107. See id. at 1055.
108. See id.
109. Id
110. Robinson, 117 S. Ct at 848.
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never had an employment relationship with the employer at
issue.""' Thus, the Court concluded that the "term 'individual'
does not seem designed to capture former employees, as distinct
from current employees, and its use provides no insight into
whether
the term 'employees' is limited only to current employ2
ees.""
Use of the term "employee" in the section 704(a) context,
however, leaves little doubt that it unambiguously does not
include former employees. The section's terms limit its scope to
cover only "his employees and applicants."" Moreover, although the definition of "employee" is open to multiple interpretations," a person "employed by an employer" has a common, plain and ordinary meaning which indicates the existence
of a present employment relationship. Additionally, Congress
could have expressly included former employees when the Act
was written and again in 1991, but yet, there is no evidence
that Congress ever contemplated the former employee issue or
intended to cover them under section 704(a)." It is apparent
that Congress can use the words "former employees" where it
clearly intends such coverage. 1 Finally, the difference between language used in sections 703 and 704(a) defining the
scope of the protected class and the express coverage of "applicants for employment" suggests that even though "employee"
may have multiple meanings throughout Title VII, it does not
include former employees in the section 704(a) context. Thus,
the statute should not have been read to grant an implicit right
of action to a class of individuals Congress never
envisioned." 7

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
114. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
115. Justice Scalia seemed to indicate as much during oral argument on Robinson,

stating "[i]f I were a Congressman, I would have a hard time figuring out how an
employer could retaliate against somebody who is no longer an employee. He could
retaliate by refusing to rehire the guy, perhaps. But, in that case, he's covered because he would be an applicant for employment." Transcript at *11, Robinson, No. 951376, 1996 WL 656475 (U.S. Nov. 6, 1996).
116. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
117. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 117 S.
Ct. 843 (1997). "We are simply prohibited from reading into the clear language of the
definition of 'employee' that which Congress did not include." Id.
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The Court's inquiry should have concluded with the plain
meaning of section 704(a)."' In the most recent efforts to confine judicial interpretation to the language Congress chooses
and avoid debates over policy and legislative history, the Court
should have concluded that reading the language of section
704(a) and section 701(f) in pari materia leads unambiguously
to the conclusion that former employees are not protected from
retaliation under Title VII." Given other courts' treatment of
this issue, however, it was likely that the Supreme Court would
move beyond Title virs express language. The Court concluded
that the language of section 704(a) was ambiguous and implied
that a strict interpretation of that language would lead to absurd results which Congress could not have intended." ° This
threshold finding opened the door to policy analysis,' which
was relied on nearly exclusively by courts previously considering the issue. Even though the Court squared the inclusion of
former employees with the statutory language of section 704(a),
it did not recognize that such coverage may not further many of
Title VIIs underlying policies.
IV. EXPANDING SECTION 704(A): INCONSISTENT WITH TITLE
VII's UNDERLYING FRAMEWORK
Despite the significant interpretational questions regarding
the statutory language used in section 704(a), few courts paid
more than passing attention to Congress' word choice before
moving quickly to the policy bases for broadening the scope of
Title virs anti-retaliation provision.'
There are numerous

118. "We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and*means in a statute what it says there. When
the words of a statute are unambiguous, then this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.'" Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254
(1992).
119. See Robinson, 70 F.3d at 328 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc.,
489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989)).
120. See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 848.
121. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 20 (1983) and Crooks v. Harrelson,
282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930) discussing the ambiguity and absurdity exceptions to the
plain-meaning rule. But see Robinson, 70 F.3d at 329 (rejecting exceptions to the
plain-meaning rule in the case of section 704(a)).
122. See Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d 1360, 1365 (4th Cir. 1992) (criticizing other
circuit courts for ignoring the clear language of section 704(a) in favor of decisions
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policy-based arguments that have developed through repeated
analysis of the issue which support an expansive reading of
section 704(a), but expansion is also inconsistent with many of
the underlying policies of Title VII. The earliest interpretation
expanding section 704(a)'s scope relied significantly on interpretations of similar statutory language in the FLSA and policy
justifications which Title VII effectively addresses without extending its scope to former employees.
A. Reliance on DissimilarAuthority and a Failure to Analyze
Title VII's Framework Independently Lead Courts Down the
Wrong Path
In Rutherford, the Tenth Circuit expanded section 704(a)
coverage,'
and cited with approval two earlier cases interpreting similar anti-retaliation language in the FLSA.' Relying on Hodgson v. Charles Martin Inspectors of Petroleum,
Inc.' s and Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 6 the court concluded that there was no ground for affording any less protection to former employees than to current employees.' 7 The
Rutherford court was persuaded by the broad coverage previously established under the FLSA. This reliance, however, was
misplaced for several reasons.
Hodgson rejected district court analysis that had found the
probability of damaging employer retaliation remote and speculative." Explaining the need to shield former employees, the
Hodgson court reasoned that the possibility of retaliation is far

based "entirely on dubious considerations of policy and the supposed purpose of the
statute"), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Polsby v. Shalala, 507 U.S. 1048 (1993).
123. See Rutherford, 565 F.2d 1162, 1165-66 (10th Cir. 1977).
124. The FLSA provides that "it shall be unlawful for any person to discharge or
in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has
filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or
related to this act . .. or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding."
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1994). It further provides that an "'employee' means any individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (1994).
125. 459 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1972).
126. 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977).
127. See Rutherford, 565 F.2d at 1166 (10th Cir. 1977) (quoting Hodgson, 459 F.2d
at 306 (5th Cir. 1972)).
128. See Hodgson, 459 F.2d at 306 (5th Cir. 1972).
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from "remote and speculative" with respect to former employees
for three reasons.' 9
First, it is a fact of business life that employers almost
invariably require prospective employees to provide the
names of their previous employers as references when applying for a job. Defendant's former employees could be
severely handicapped in their efforts to obtain new jobs if
the defendant should brand them as "informers" when references are sought. Second, there is the possibility that a
former employee may be subjected to retaliation by his new
employer if that employer finds out that the employee has
in the past cooperated with the Secretary. Third, a former
employee may find it desirable or necessary to seek reemployment with the defendant. In such a case the former employee would stand the same risk of retaliation as the present employee.3
Reliance on these justifications is troublesome primarily because section 704(a)'s anti-retaliation language expressly addresses the concerns raised by Hodgson without any extended
coverage of former employees.
Retaliation or discrimination by an employer against a current employee for his or her participation in Title VII enforcement activity is prohibited, regardless of whether that activity
is directed at the current employer, a past employer, or other
covered entity."l No extension of section 704(a) is necessary
to protect employees from discrimination by their current employer. Section 704(a)'s express language protects these individuals. Thus, even if the employee's participation in enforcement
activity is directed at another covered entity (i.e., a former
employer, employment agency, or union), a current employer is
prohibited from discriminating against the employee for engaging in such activity.
Moreover, section 704(a) expressly covers applicants for employment, and does not limit its protection to any particular

129. Id

130. Id
131. See supra Part Ifl.A. (discussing breadth of section 704(a) and emphasizing
that it covers not only traditional retaliation, but all forms of discriminatory conduct
directed at participants in enforcement related activities).
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type of applicant. It equally protects first-time applicants as
well as those seeking reemployment with a former employer. It
effectively prohibits discrimination against an ex-employee, as
an applicant for employment, where he or she is seeking reemployment with a former employer. 3 2 This protection exists
without any extension of section 704(a). Thus, the examples
cited in Hodgson which support an expansive interpretation of
the FLSA, do not carry equal force for an extension of section
704(a), which already addresses these concerns. Similarly, cases
often cited to support extending section 704(a) coverage do not
necessarily require an extension to provide an effective remedy
for the aggrieved former employee.
In EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co.,"m the plaintiff (a former employee) alleged that the defendant withdrew its offer to reinstate him based on retaliation.' 4 The plaintiff had been discharged, but was offered reinstatement by his former employer.
The former employer then allegedly withdrew its offer of reinstatement after a co-employee protested the plaintiffs original
discharge." Although the court relied heavily on precedent
extending the protection of section 704(a) to former employees," the plaintiffs claim was more appropriately cognizable
as one of an applicant for employment, without considering his
status as a former employee.
Similarly, in Christopher v. Stouder Memorial Hospital, 7
the plaintiffs claim was more appropriately analyzed as one
growing out of the defendant's unusual ability to directly impact the plaintiffs future employment. In Christopher, a nurse
who had briefly held a position at Stouder Memorial Hospital,
was seeking limited privileges at the hospital as a private duty
scrub nurse.' Although Christopher was not seeking to re-

132. See id
133. 7 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 1993).
134. See id. at 542.

135. See id.
136. See ia. at 544 (relying on Passer v. American Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322
(D.C. Cir. 1991). (holding former employee could maintain an action under the ADEA
anti-retaliation provision) and Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506 (lth Cir. 1988)
(holding section 704(a) protected former employees because strict and narrow interpretation would undercut remedial purpose of statute)).
137. 936 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1991).
138. See i&L at 872.
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enter an employment relationship with the hospital," 9 the
hospital did control her ability to practice as a private scrub
nurse at its facility.' The court, therefore, properly focused
more on Stouder's ability to impact Christopher's employment
opportunities, similar to that of a union hiring hall or employment agency, than its role as her former employer."
Finally, the legislative history and earlier interpretations of
the FLSA were far more supportive of an expansive reading of
its anti-retaliation language than its Title VII counterpart in
section 704(a). "Senator (later Justice) Black stated on the floor
of the Senate during the debates of the [FLSA] that the term
'employee' had been given 'the broadest definition that has ever
been included in any one act."'
Moreover, the Supreme
Court had determined that it was the "Congressional intention
to include all employees within the scope of the [FLSA] unless

139. As the court noted, "[pirivate duty scrub nurses are normally paid by the
doctors with whom they work. They are not employees of the hospital itself, and the
hospital does not cover their insurance or benefits." Id.
140. See id. at 874.
141. See id. at 875 (analogizing to Sibley Mem. Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338
(D.C. Cir. 1973)).
In Sibley, a male private duty nurse claimed that a hospital discriminated
against him on the basis of his sex because the hospital's nursing office would not
refer him to female patients. The court determined "that the hospital, while not the
plaintiffs employer, was in the same position to interfere with the plaintiffs employment opportunities as unions or employment agencies," and therefore, neither the
spirit nor language of the Act prohibited the plaintiff from proceeding against the
hospital. Id. at 1342.
The claim in Sibley was based on sexual discrimination prohibited by section
703. As previously discussed, section 703 prohibits discrimination against any "individual" on the basis of sex. The court reasoned that the hospital's similarity in these
circumstances, to a union or employment agency which has "a highly visible nexus
with the creation and continuance of direct employment relationships" made a claim
against the hospital cognizable in the absence of a direct employment relationship
with the plaintiff. Id. This rationale applies equally in the section 704(a) (anti-retaliation) context. Like section 703, section 704(a) expressly protects "individuals" engaging
in enforcement activities under Title VII from discrimination by an employment agency. See supra note 104 (noting that "individuals" are protected from discrimination
and retaliation by employment agencies and labor organizations in sections 703 and
704(a)). Thus, Christopher, like Sibley, stands for the proposition that a covered employer in a position analogous to that of a union or employment agency may be liable
for discriminatory conduct in the absence of an employment relationship. No extension
of section 704(a) to protect former employees is required to reach this conclusion.
142. Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139, 143 (6th Cir. 1977) (quoting
United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 n.3 (1945)).
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specifically excluded."' Additionally, the FLSA's remedy provisions were much broader than Title VII's original equitable
remedy provisions.'
Although concern for a former employee's ability to obtain
fair and accurate references and other benefits of employment
weigh in favor of protecting them from retaliation for exercising
Title VII rights, reliance on FLSA precedent of Hodgson and
Dunlop is questionable. Unfortunately, the Rutherford court
provided little independent analysis of the interplay of these
issues in the context of Title VII, adding only that a "statute
which is remedial in nature should be liberally construed."'
B. Title VI's Remedial Purpose
The most significant, and in many cases only, justification
announced by courts which expanded section 704(a) to cover
former employees was that the remedial purpose of the statute
required a broad interpretation.' It was argued that a broad
reading of section 704(a), producing a comprehensive federal
remedy, would further Congress' underlying intent to eliminate
discrimination in employment relationships. Moreover, this
interpretation was partly supported by the liberal construction
granted other remedial statutes. 4 7 Even in light of Title VII's

143. Id at 143-44 (quoting Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. at 363).
144. See Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527, 1541 n.7 (11th Cir.
1990) (Tioflat, C.J., specially concurring) (criticizing reliance on FLSA cases to extend
scope of section 704(a) because of differing remedy provisions). See also infra Part
IV.D. (arguing that Title VIrs original remedy provisions do not support a conclusion
that section 704(a) was intended to cover former employees, and that subsequent
amendment by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not implicitly amend section 704(a)'s
scope).
145. 565 F.2d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 1977).
146. See Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., Inc., 581 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir. 1978)
(concluding that "a narrow construction would not give effect to the statute's purpose,
which is to furnish a remedy against an employer's use of discrimination in connection with a prospective, present or past employment relationship") (emphasis added).
It is unclear where the court gleaned this statutory purpose for section 704(a), as it
cited no authority for such an expansive proposition.

147. See Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977) (FLSA);
Hodgson v. Charles Martin Inspectors of Petroleum, Inc., 459 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1972)
(FLSA). See also NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972) (expressing preference
for a broad reading of a remedial statute, where consistent with the purpose and
objective of the statute).
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remedial purpose, however, the statute has recognized limitations.
Courts broadly interpreting section 704(a)'s coverage relied
primarily on the remedial purpose underlying Title VII and the
need to protect former employees from retaliatory conduct. The
purpose of Title VII is to enhance the opportunities of minorities to "be hired on the basis of merit"' by eliminating "discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, or
national origin."149 This primary purpose could be thwarted by
under-enforcement of the Act's substantive provisions because of
threatened retaliation. 5 0
The potential for retaliatory conduct can arise frequently
where an employee, after discharge, files a Title VII action
alleging the discharge or some earlier employment action (e.g.,
failure to promote) was discriminatory. 5 ' Although employed
at the time of the discriminatory conduct, it is argued that the
former employee would be subject to subsequent retaliation by
the employer, and would not be covered without extending the
scope of section 704(a). Moreover, courts hastened to point out
that discrimination against a former employee may, in many
instances be worse than discrimination practiced against a
current or prospective employee. 5 ' Congress, it is argued,
could never have intended to allow this type of postemployment
retaliatory conduct." But Congress, in Title VII, did not create an all-encompassing employment discrimination remedy.

148. 110 CONG. REc. 6549 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
149. H.R. REP. No. 914 (1964) reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.CAN. 2355, 2391, 2401.
150. But see infra Part N.C. (arguing that failure to include former employees in
section 704(a) will not result in under-enforcement).
151. See Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 1994).
152. See id at 200 (suggesting that "post-employment blacklisting is sometimes
more damaging than on-the-job discrimination because an employee subject to discrimination on the job will often continue to receive a paycheck while a former employee
subject to retaliation may be prevented from obtaining any work in the trade or occupation previously pursued").
153. See, e.g., id. (finding that "Congress hardly intended to permit employers to
retaliate with impunity against a former employee after an assertion of Title VII
rights"); EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541, 543 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that "[iun
enacting section [704(a)] Congress unmistakably intended to ensure that no person
would be deterred from exercising his rights under Title VII by the threat of discriminatory retaliation") (emphasis added).

1997]

ROBINSON V. SHELL OIL CO.

Title VII is not a panacea to remedy all employment related
It is "not a 'bad acts' statute."" s Rather,
discrimination.'
Title VII's enactment was the result of substantial compromises
Courts have struggled to define
in scope and application."
previously recognized the limitahave
and
Title VII's coverage
tions Congress placed on its scope.
Courts expanding section 704(a) to cover former employees
often relied on the apparent absurdity that would result from
protecting prospective and current employees from retaliation
for participation in enforcement activity, without protecting
former employees. Defining a statute's scope, however, to include some and exclude others is not patently absurd. The
exclusion of former employees from section 704(a) is no more
absurd than the exclusion of an employee of an employer with
fewer than fifteen persons from racial and sexual discrimination
under section 703(a).' The point, simply, is that Title VII
was not drafted to protect every employee from every form of
discrimination. Where there is line-drawing in the scope and
application of a statute seemingly absurd results will follow
where persons in substantially similar, but not exactly the
same, circumstances will be treated differently, some falling
within, and others falling outside the boundaries of the statute.
Congress weighed policy considerations and, for better or worse,
decided against covering all employers, employees, and employment relationships under Title VII.'

154. See Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d 1360, 1365 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that Title
VII "does not redress discriminatory practices, however unsavory, which occur after
the employment relationship has ended"), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Polsby
v. Shalala, 507 U.S. 1048 (1993).
155. See id. (quoting Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 828 (4th Cir. 1989)).
156. See Herbert Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and 1972:
A Critical Analysis of the Legislative History and Administration of the Law, 2 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 1, 2 (1977) (commenting on over one hundred amendments to The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 occurring during the legislative process).
157. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994) (defining a covered employer as one with
fifteen or more employees).
158. See Falls v. Sporting News Pubrg Co., 834 F.2d 611, 613 (6th Cir. 1987)
(holding that even though "employee" is to be construed broadly, it was not meant to
reach independent contractors). A former employee, one with whom no employment

relationship currently exists (or may not have existed for a significant period of time),
should not be afforded more protection from retaliation than an individual currently
engaged in a contractual quasi-employment relationship with a covered entity. While
expanding the scope of section 704(a) may enlarge the class of protected persons, it
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Undoubtedly, the courts' prior construction of similar language in other remedial statutes lends support to a consistent
construction of Title VII's anti-retaliation language. 5 9 Again,
however, these statutes have similar, but not identical language, purposes, and remedies. Title VIIs scope need not be
construed to be coextensive where it differs in significant respects from these other "remedial statutes." Moreover, not all of
Title VII's underlying provisions and policies are furthered by
an extension of section 704(a) to protect former employees."
C. Enforcing Title VII Through Existing Remedies Would Not
Chill Claims
Effective Title VII enforcement relies, at least initially, on the
willingness of individuals to report suspected violations.'' The
Robinson Court cited this enforcement scheme as a primary
reason to extend protection from retaliation to former
employees.'6 2 In the absence of such protection, proponents of
extension argued that the threat of retaliation would chill Title
VII claims.'" The EEOC, charged with enforcing the statute,
had interpreted section 704(a) to include former employees'
and argued persuasively in Robinson that section 704(a) must
include former employees in order that Title VII effectively
prevent postemployment retaliation." These arguments and

does not eliminate seemingly absurd results that flow naturally from line-drawing.
159. See Moore, supra note 20, at 214-18 (supporting broad interpretation of section 704(a) by Court's prior broad interpretations of other remedial employment statutes (i.e., FLSA, NLRA, ADEA)).
160. See infra Part 1V.E. (discussing Title VIrs short period of limitations and
Congress' obvious intent to limit time-frame of potential employment disputes).
161. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994) (setting out how an aggrieved individual files
a charge with the EEOC, thereby beginning investigation and enforcement proceedings).
162. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843, 848-49 (1997). See also Tafuri,
supra note 19, at 810-14.
163. See Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that "fear of unremediable reprisal would chill Title VII claims for discriminatory
discharges"); Barna, supra note 21, at 269; Tafuri, supra note 19, at 813.
164. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.101(b) (1992) (stating "No person shall be subject to
retaliation for opposing any practice made unlawful by Title VII) (emphasis added);
EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 614.7(f) (stating "respondent employer's obligation to
refrain from retaliation against a former employee who has opposed discrimination
does not end once that employee leaves its employ").
165. See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 849. In light of the Supreme Court's inconsistent
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the examples cited to support them often fail to take account of
other remedies, both within Title VII and at common law, that
would adequately protect the interests of former employees."
Despite these remedies, some still contend that overarching
federal protection is necessary to protect former employees from
an employer's retaliatory conduct that is calculated to fall between the cracks of a piece-meal approach under existing statutory and common-law remedies. 67
Both opponents and proponents of section 704(a)'s extension
recognize that individual reporting drives enforcement of Title
VII.'" Individuals responsible for enforcing the Act's substantive provisions "cannot be penalized for resorting to the legal
procedures that Congress has established in order to right congressionally recognized wrongs. " ' An expansion of section
704(a)'s language, however, does not necessarily follow from
this premise. Many cases extending section 704(a) coverage
could have provided effective relief under existing Title VII
provisions or common-law remedies.'

deference to EEOC interpretations of the Act in the past, the weight that the
agency's interpretation carried in the section 704(a) conflict was far from clear until
Robinson. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (stating that the
"administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great
deference) with General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-42 (1976) (stating that
"Congress ...
did not confer upon the EEOC authority to promulgate rules or regulations." The level of deference that should be afforded therefore depends on "the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control."). See also Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (reviewing agency interpretations generally). Where "there is an express delegation of authority to an agency to elucidate a
specific provision of the statute by regulation ...
legislative regulations are given
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute." Id. Where the delegation is implicit rather than explicit, however, "a court
may not substitute its own construction of statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency." Id.
166. See Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
167. See Tafuri, supra note 19, at 819 (arguing that "[flormer employers no doubt
would be savvy enough not to engage in retaliation that could give rise to state
claims or criminal charges, thereby immunizing themselves against any type of penal-

ty").
168. See Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990)
(TUoflat, C.J., specially concurring). Accord Tafuri, supra note 19, at 813.
169. East v. Remine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 340 (5th Cir. 1975).
170. See, e.g., supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text (discussing alternative
analysis and grounds of relief in Christopher v. Stouder Mem. Hosp., 936 F.2d 870
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1. Title VII Protection
In Sherman v. Burke Contracting,Inc.,'" the court extended
coverage under section 704(a) to a former employee, even
though Sherman's claim was clearly cognizable under existing
section 704(a) protections. Sherman, an African American, alleged that Burke terminated his employment because he was
married to a white woman.'
Sherman filed a timely complaint with the EEOC alleging discriminatory discharge. Thereafter, Sherman secured employment with another contractor,
Palmer Construction Company (Palmer).17 Sherman was then
fired by Palmer. Sherman alleged that Burke had retaliated
against him by persuading Palmer to fire him.'74 Sherman
sued his former employer, Burke, but more clearly had a cause
of action against Palmer, his employer at the time of the alleged discriminatory conduct, for discriminating against him
because of his participation in Title VII enforcement activity.
"Sherman had already obtained new employment when the act
of retaliation occurred." 75 More importantly, the "act" of discrimination was not Burke's rhetoric, regardless of its persuasiveness, but rather Palmer's discriminatory termination of
Sherman based on his participation in enforcement activity.
Sherman's remedy under section 704(a) was against Palmer, the
discriminatory actor and his employer at the time of the alleged
retaliation. Thus, Sherman should have maintained an action
against Burke for discriminatory discharge on the basis of race
under section 703, and against Palmer for discriminatory discharge on the basis of participation in enforcement activity
under section 704(a). No extension of section 704(a) was required to provide Sherman adequate relief under these circumstances.
Similarly, in Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce,'76
the plaintiff alleged that her former employer retaliated against
(6th Cir. 1991)).
171. 891 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1990).
172. See id at 1529.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. Id- at 1532.
176. 565 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1977).
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her by informing prospective employers that she had filed a
discrimination charge. Rutherford claimed that a prospective
employer refused to hire her after receiving this
information.'" The court rejected a "literal reading" of section
704(a), and instead expanded its scope to encompass former
employees allowing Rutherford to assert a cause of action
against her former employer. ' This interpretation does not
properly take notice of the existing remedies that Congress
made available in section 704(a). Rutherford was an "applicant
for employment" and had an adequate remedy under the express terms of section 704(a) against any prospective employer
who discriminated against her on the basis of her prior Title
VII activities."
Thus, the intended remedy under section
704(a) lies against any prospective employer that utilizes an
applicant's participation in enforcement activities as a factor in
its decision-making process. A "literal reading" of the section
does not foreclose this remedy.' More importantly, the Rutherford court's expanded construction of section 704(a) allowed
Rutherford to seek a remedy, but avoid prosecuting her claim
against the discriminatory prospective employer. This is the
remedy Congress clearly wished an individual in Rutherford's
situation to exercise when seeking relief, because it explicitly
included protection for applicants for employment in section
704(a)."' Thus, the Sherman and Rutherford courts' expansion
of section 704(a) allows the plaintiff to forego action against the
employer who actually practices discriminatory conduct, but recover from a former employer.

177. See id. at 1164.
178. Id. at 1165.
179. See Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d 1360, 1365 n.4 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that
'Title VII does redress discriminatory practices by a prospective employer who denies
employment to an applicant who has participated in a Title VII action against a
former employer"), vacated on other grounds sub nor. Polsby v. Shalala, 507 U.S.
1048 (1993).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 133-36 (discussing alternate analysis and
grounds of relief for plaintiff as an "applicant for employment" in EEOC v. Ohio
Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 1993)).
181. It is unclear in the cases presented, why employees chose to sue former employers rather than prospective ones. Most likely, this decision is based on the same
principles that generally guide a plaintiff's choice of defendant. These include availability of proof and an ability to satisfy a judgment, but may also stem from animosity toward the former employer for the circumstances that surrounded the employee's
termination.
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2. Common-Law Protection
State common-law remedies also provide protection for former
employees. 2 In Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., Inc.,"8 the
plaintiff alleged that her former employer made "disparaging
and untrue statements about her to her prospective employers."1" False references would give rise to an action for defamation. 1" Although an employer could claim a qualified privilege with respect to information furnished to prospective employers about a candidate's qualifications, the privilege would
not immunize the former employer where it knowingly or with
a reckless disregard for the truth furnished false information." This knowing or reckless standard would certainly be
satisfied where a former employer falsified a reference in retaliation for an individual's assertion of Title VII rights. Moreover,
it would properly limit an employer's duty to defend, in cases
where accurate, but negative information was related to a prospective employer. 87
In Reed v. Shepard,' the plaintiff alleged that she was the
victim of postemployment retaliation. This retaliation included a
grand jury investigation of her purported illegal activities while
employed with her former employer; an attack by a disguised
assailant urging her to drop her discrimination action; late
night phone calls threatening her with reprisals for continuing
the lawsuit; and someone shooting at her car while she was
driving.'89 The court concluded that "Reed may have had a
state law damage claim and perhaps a criminal charge[, but]
182. See, e.g., Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
183. 581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978).
184. Id. at 1054.
185. See Edward R. Horken, Note, Contracting Around the Law of Defamation and
Employment References, 79 VA. L. REV. 517, 520-23 (1993) (discussing defamation in
context of employment references); Bradley Saxton, Flaws in the Laws Governing
Employment References: Problems of "Overdeterrence"and a Proposal for Reform, 13
YALE L. & POLY REV. 45, 69-74 (1995) (same).
186. See Horken, supra note 185, at 23-26 (discussing defense of qualified privilege
in context of employer-employee relationship); Bradley, supra note 185, at 69-74

(same).
187. See infra Part V.C. (discussing defendants increased duty to defend under an
expansive reading of section 704(a)).
188. 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
189. See id. at 492.
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Title VII does not address such claims."" Thus, the court recognized both the limitations of Title VII and the other avenues
of relief available to remedy such wrongful conduct.
D. Original Title VII Remedies Suggest FormerEmployees Were
Not Contemplated
Some courts have argued that the remedies available to a
successful plaintiff under Title VIrs original framework also
support a narrow interpretation of section 704(a)."9 Originally, Title VII provided only equitable relief to successful claimants. 2 In both Polsby and Sherman the courts suggested that
these remedies were more suited to afford complete relief to a
claimant against a current or prospective employer than a former one. Equitable relief directed at these entities is most effective because the "current or prospective employer has control
over the conditions of the workplace and is in a position to
correct the acts of discrimination." 3 On the other hand, equitable relief is less beneficial to a former employee who has suffered postemployment retaliation.'
Under the circumstances of most postemployment retaliation,
the former employee is not seeking reinstatement or hiring
from the employer that has allegedly perpetrated the discriminatory act. Although neither Polsby nor Sherman offer any
examples where equitable relief could meet some needs of former employees, there are equitable decrees that could provide
partial prospective relief. For example, a former employer could
be enjoined from providing incorrect or misleading information
to prospective employers in future references. Additionally, a
former employer could be ordered to provide references to pro-

190. Id. at 493.
191. See Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d 1360, 1366 (4th Cir. 1992) vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Polsby v. Shalala, 507 U.S. 1048 (1993); Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527, 1538 (11th Cir. 1990) (TIoflat, C.J., specially concurring).
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994) (providing that the court may enjoin the
defendant from engaging in any unlawful employment practice, "and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is limited to, reinstatement or hiring... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.") (emphasis added).
193. Sherman, 891 F.2d at 1538 (TIjoflat, C.J., specially concurring).
194. See Polsby, 970 F.2d at 1365.
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spective employers when it had previously refused. These remedies offer some relief, but they do not provide the depth of
"make-whole" relief available to current employees or applicants
for employment against current or prospective employers. The
inability of these remedies to afford complete judicial relief for
discrimination encountered by former employees suggests that
these individuals were not the intended beneficiaries of section
704(a) coverage.'95 Instead, former employees were left to
more appropriate remedies existing under other federal and
state legislation." This argument remains persuasive despite
amendments that
have enhanced and enlarged Title Virs reme19 7
dy provisions.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 significantly enhanced the remedies available to successful Title VII plaintiffs, providing both
compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional
discrimination." These remedies provide more comprehensive
relief to former employees subjected to postemployment retaliation. Some commentators have suggested that, in light of the
1991 amendments, the remedies argument is moot.'
The
court in Polsby however, found that even with the availability

195. See id at 1366.
Although a situation may arise where fashioning equitable relief presents
no problems, the better solution is to allow the ex-employee to seek either state or other federal law remedies against the former employer or
the same Title VII remedies against the prospective employer who based
its decision not to employ the ex-employee on the fact that she sought
Title VII relief from a prior employer.
Id. See also Sherman, 891 F.2d at 1538 (TIjoflat, C.J., specially concurring) (arguing
that the inability of Title VHrs equitable remedies to provide complete relief illustrates "why Congress gave a cause of action only to current employees and job applicants").
196. The Polsby court further suggested that including former employees within the
scope of section 704(a) could have a damaging preclusive effect on their other avenues
of judicial relief. See Polsby, 970 F.2d at 1366. Citing Brown v. GSA, the court noted
that Congress could never have intended to lock former employees into a Title VII
remedy, which at that time provided only equitable relief and could not "make-whole"
a damaged claimant. See id. (citing Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976) (holding
Title VII "provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment")).
197. But cf Barna, supra note 21, at 262 n.16; Moore, supra note 20, at 218 n.85
(arguing that based on 1991 amendments, ability to now obtain legal relief under
Title VII is additional support for extending section 704(a) protection to former employees); Tafuri, supra note 19, at 803.
198. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994).
199. See Tafuri, supra note 19, at 803, 817-18.
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of these enhanced remedies, proof of damages against former
employers would require purely speculative calculations.2"
More importantly, the 1991 amendments did not expressly enlarge the scope of section 704(a)."' Therefore, the best indications of Congress' intent regarding the coverage of former employees in section 704(a) remain the remedy provisions it originally put in place to effectuate the section's purpose. The narrow remedies available before the Civil Rights Act of 1991, suggest that Congress did not intend to include former employees
within section 704(a).
E. Title VIrs Short Limitations Period is Undermined by
Section 704(a) Expansion
The limitations period for filing charges and subsequent civil
actions are an additional part of Title VII's statutory framework
that support a narrow reading of section 704(a). Title VIrs
limitations periods for filing charges and civil actions is relatively short. An aggrieved party must file a charge with the
EEOC within 180 days (or 300 days in states with a deferral
agency) from the occurrence of the unlawful employment practice.2" The party must file a subsequent civil action within
ninety days of receipt of a "right-to-sue" notification. 3 A
"bright-line" approach whereby no claim under section 704(a)
could arise after the termination of the employment relationship is undoubtedly more consistent with this short limitations
period."°
A short limitations period evinces Congress' intent to resolve
employment disputes quickly, without prolonged disruption in

200. See Polsby, 970 F.2d at 1366. The court provided an example analogous to the
facts in Robinson to demonstrate this difficulty in proof. "If the former employer
wrote poor references in retaliation, the employee would have to show that but for
the poor references, she would have received one of the jobs she was seeking. If successful, she then must give the court evidence as to which job, pay scale, promotions,
bonuses, etc.... she would have received." Id.
201. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
202. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (1994).
203. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994).
204. See, e.g., Respondent's Brief at *32, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., No. 95-1376,
1996 WL 419672 (U.S. July 25, 1996) (arguing that including former employees within section 704(a) would create a cause of action "unlimited in time").
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the workplace."' 5 Furthermore, a short limitations period prevents burdensome stale claims complicated by the dissipation of
proof over time, fading memories and missing witnesses. It
could be argued that, in many instances, the expansion of section 704(a) would not give rise to these problems. Since the
limitations period accrues on the occurrence of the discriminatory act. 6 (e.g., the retaliatory reference), the discriminating actors and the evidence would be as fresh as in any other Title
VII case. This is not necessarily true, however, where the discriminatory acts and subsequent effects are remote events. For
example, a supervisor could pad an ex-employee's file with
negative comments after being the target of an EEOC charge,
but leave the employer and an unknowing replacement to disseminate incorrect assessments of the ex-employee's performance when references are requested several years in the future. In this case, the discriminatory act, dissemination of a
false or misleading reference, could occur based on documentation recorded by a supervisory employee who left the employer
years before the reference was actually given by a subsequent
supervisor."07 Moreover, even assuming no personnel changes,
the facts surrounding the initial charge that brings about subsequent retaliation may have occurred well before the retaliation itself. These long forgotten details of the initial charge
would have a significant impact on the later retaliation claim.
An example of this open-ended liability is illustrated by the
8 Christofacts of Christopher v. Stouder Memorial Hospital."'
pher alleged that she was denied nursing privileges at Stouder
Memorial in part because her former employer (Wright State
University School of Nursing) informed Stouder that she had
filed a sex discrimination charge against it." ° Although Chris205. See id.
206. See, e.g., Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980) (determining
what constitutes an "occurrence" of a discriminatory act).
207. But see Transcript at *17-18, Robinson, No. 95-1376, 1996 WL 656475 (U.S.
Nov. 6, 1997). Petitioner argued that long intervals, such as ten or more years, between the end of the employment relationship and alleged postemployment retaliation
are not within the EEOC's experience. "T]hat is really a very remote situation, and
it has to be contrasted with the very realistic situation, where somebody goes to the
EEOC and, very quickly after that, suffers retaliation." Id& See also Tafuri, supra note
19, at 821 (dismissing stale claims as too infrequent to justify denying coverage to
former employees).
208. 936 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1991).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 13541 (discussing facts surrounding
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topher sued Stouder for denial of her nursing privileges, under
the expanded section 704(a) she could have sued Wright State,
her former employer, for retaliating against her by informing
Stouder of the prior charge.21 Christopher had been employed
by

Wright State from

1978-83."'

Wright

State informed

Stouder of the charge in 1986, in response to Stouder's inquiry. An expansive reading section 704(a) would leave Wright
State open to liability three years after Christopher left its
employ.
The three-year delay under the relatively typical circumstances present in Christophersignificantly conflicts with the purposes that underlie Title VII's short limitations period. It significantly increases an employer's exposure to liability long after
the employment relationship that is the basis of the action has
ended. Moreover, in many cases the lapse in time between the
existence of an employment relationship and a subsequent civil
action for retaliation could be much longer than three years."
V. ROBINSON V. SHELL OIL Co.: AN EMPLOYER'S EXPANDED
DUTY TO DEFEND

The facts of Robinson illustrate one of the significant concerns attendant with enlarging the scope of section 704(a). As
previously noted, a purposefully false and misleading reference
gives rise to a common-law action for defamation." 4 Generally, a truthful, but negative or critical reference would not give
rise to such an action. A truthful, but negative reference could,
however, give rise to a claim under the expanded section 704(a)

Stouder's denial of nursing privileges).
210. See, e.g., Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir.
1977) (finding that informing a prospective employer of a former employee's Title VII
enforcement activity was retaliatory in and of itself and actionable under section

704(a)).
211. See Christopher,936 F.2d at 871.
212. See Ud.at 873.
213. See Respondent's Brief at *32-33, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., No. 95-1376, 1996
WL 419672 (U.S. July 25, 1996) (arguing that a "cause of action for retaliation could
be brought one, five, or even twenty years after the job ended (since the cause of
action would not accrue until the alleged retaliation occurred)").
214. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
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where the employer gave a truthful reference with the intent to
retaliate against a former employee. 5
A former employer could become subject to burdensome litigation by providing prospective employers with additional or detailed information of a former employee's employment history,
or discussing the circumstances surrounding the employee's
termination and subsequent relationship with the employer.2 16
Conversely, an employer cannot effectively insulate itself from
liability by remaining silent about a former employee's performance, as this too could indicate an intent to retaliate.2 17 In
expanding section 704(a), the Court has turned the focus of
inquiry from the difficult determination of the "truthfulness" of
an employer's disclosure to an even murkier one, the employer's
latent motivations.
The sections that follow discuss the Supreme Court's brief
policy analysis in Robinson which led to section 704(a)'s expansion. Additionally, they compare the likely repercussions had
the Court excluded former employees from section 704(a) coverage with the Court's decision to extend that coverage. There is
likely to be a significant impact on relations between employers
and former employees under Robinson. The increasing trend of
litigation in employment law, as well as the cases which have
already tested this area of expanded coverage raise particular
concerns about an employer's significantly increased duty to
defend claims under Robinson's interpretation of section 704(a).
A.

The Policies That Drive the Robinson Decision

After determining that section 704(a)'s use of "employees"
was ambiguous, the Robinson Court followed the lead of the

215. Cf Christopher, 936 F.2d at 879 (holding that even if new hospital standards
were valid, their application to the plaintiff, the first person to be evaluated under
them, was retaliatory).
216. See Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162, 1164 (10th
Cir. 1977).
217. See Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., Inc., 581 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir. 1978).
But see Tafuri, supra note 19, at 819 n.139 (arguing that without anti-retaliation
protection, "employers could discriminate by refusing to give references to employees
who filed Title VII claims, while giving references to those who do not oppose discriminatory practices. This would shield the employer from a defamation suit, while
still injuring the employee in her pursuit of other employment.").
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circuit courts and dispensed with the policy analysis in a mere
three paragraphs." The Court first noted that section 703
prohibits discriminatory discharge and that section 704(a) protects from discrimination for the filing of EEOC charges. 2"
The Court reasoned that since there is a potentially significant
class of persons that will be discriminatorily discharged, and
thus, filing charges as former employees, "it is far more consistent [with the regulatory scheme of Title VII] to include former
employees within the scope of 'employees' protected by section
704(a)."220
The Court then noted the primary purpose of the anti-retaliation provision: "Maintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms." = ' The Court was persuaded that a
failure to protect former employees would chill Title VII claims
"by allowing the threat of post-employment retaliation to deter
victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC, and
would provide a perverse incentive for employers to fire employees who might bring Title VII claims."' The Court was apparently unpersuaded by arguments that alternative federal,
state, and common-law remedies provide sufficient protection. It
refused to recognize the existence of these other remedies and
found that a failure to extend section 704(a) protection would
allow "an employer to retaliate with impunity."' Thus, the
Court concluded that it is "more consistent with the broader
context of Title VII and the primary purpose of [section] 704(a)"
to include former employees within the Act's protective
scope.'
B. The Repercussions of Excluding Former Employees from
Section 704(a)
In addition to the purportedly absurd results that would
follow from excluding former employees from Title VII protec-

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843, 848-49 (1997).
See d. at 848.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 849.
Id.
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tion, critics of the narrow interpretation pointed to a host of
complications that would endanger a former employee's future
employment opportunities without such protection. Most significant among these complications are those types of retaliatory

conduct which currently have little or no remedy without an
expansion of section 704(a).2
Passer v. American Chemical Society," presented conduct
by a former employer that would be difficult to address under
existing state and federal remedies. Dr. Passer (Passer) served
as the Director of the American Chemical Society's (ACS) Education Division from 1964 until his involuntary retirement in
1987.227 ACS had been planning a symposium to honor Passer
at its 1987 annual meeting.' ACS cancelled the symposium
following Passer's involuntary retirement and decision to file
charges of age discrimination with the EEOC.' ACS admitted that the symposium's cancellation was directly linked to
Passer's age discrimination suit. It contended, however, that it
was not motivated by retaliatory animus toward Passer, but by
an interest in successfully defending Passer's pending suit."
ACS's actions in cancelling the symposium indicated a lack of
planning and serious consideration."2 Nonetheless, the district
court held that ACS's cancellation of the Passer Symposium
was not retaliatory because "the symposium was not part of
[Passer's] past or future employment relationship with [ACS],
225. See Barna, supra note 21, at 268 (arguing that excluding former employees
from section 704(a) protection would allow "employers to harm former employees who
may have no available legal recourse").
226. 935 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Passer is an ADEA case, but as previously
noted, the ADEA's anti-retaliation language is substantially similar to Title VIrs.
Therefore, the circumstances in Passer provide analogous support for critics' contention that some retaliatory conduct would go without remedy if former employees were
not included in section 704(a).
227. See id. at 324.
228. See id. at 325 (describing the special symposium as a "rare and prestigious
laurel" and "one of the highest honors that could have been bestowed" on Passer).
229. See id.
230. See id. (noting ACS's attorney advised the Board that it "would be remiss to
allow the symposium to take place . . . [because] presentations made at the symposium might inadvertently affect the [age discrimination] suit").
231. See idUACS was aware of the discrimination charges filed by Passer in January 1987. ACS did not inform Passer of the symposium's cancellation until the night
before he was scheduled to leave for the conference, on April 5, 1987. The next afternoon, ACS notified the other speakers who had agreed to participate in the Passer
Symposium, and all voluntarily withdrew their papers. See idU
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nor did the cancellation affect his relationship with potential
employers.'2
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the ADEA's anti-retaliation language does not limit its reach to retaliatory conduct that takes "the form of cognizable employment actions such as discharge, transfer, or demotion."' Although ACS's conduct is troubling, it would not
likely give rise to any form of relief besides that available under an expansion of section 704(a).' ACS's conduct had the
effect of limiting Passer's exposure to prospective employers,
but ACS did not actually interfere with any tangible prospective
employment relationship.'
Thus, without an expansion of
section 704(a), Passer would conceivably have been left without
recourse.
The Robinson Court found that excluding former employees
from protection under section 704(a) could encourage employers
to terminate employees quickly so that the employer could
actively retaliate after the discharge." This reasoning ignores
section 704(a)'s protection of current employees. An employer's

232. Passer v. American Chem. Soc'y, 701 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1988).
233. Passer, 935 F.2d at 331.
234. But see Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527, 1542 (Tjoflat,
C.J., specially concurring) (emphasizing that the common law recognizes the torts of
malicious and intentional interference with contract and interference with prospective
economic advantage). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B provides that

"one who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's prospective contractual relation.., is subject to liability... [where] the interference consists of (a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue the prospective relation."
These existing common-law remedies would not likely have been sufficient in
Passer's circumstances, however, because the relationship between the symposium and
Passer's prospective employment was extremely tenuous. See Passer, 935 F.2d at 325
(noting that the symposium would provide Passer with "an excellent opportunity to
renew acquaintances and make contacts that might lead to new employment").
235. Cf Sherman, 891 F.2d at 1532 (former employer urged new employer to fire
employee in retaliation for employee's participation in protected Title VII enforcement
activities against the former employer).
236. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843, 848 (1997). See also Petitioner's
Brief at *29, Robinson, No. 95-1376, 1996 WL 341308 (U.S. June 21, 1996) (arguing
that "an employer that intends to discriminate against an employee would be well
advised to fire the employee, since a dismissed employee-unlike a demoted, transferred, or underpaid employee--could be openly intimidated from filing charges
through threats of retaliatory action"); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325, 334 n.4
(4th Cir. 1995) (Hall, J., dissenting) (suggesting that excluding former employees from
section 704(a) would give employers "free rein to retaliate against disfavored employees, so long as the employee is first terminated").
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discriminatory discharge for the purpose of retaliating later
would most certainly fall within existing section 704(a) protection. Thus, it is unlikely that critics' fears of employer discharges to promote a climate of hostility and patent postemployment
retaliation would be realized by denying 704(a) coverage to
former employees.
C. The Repercussions of Including FormerEmployees in Section
704(a)
Opponents of section 704(a) expansion have also made arguments about the drastic effects of such a decision. For example,
some have predicted a significant decline or end of employment
references because of an employer's increased exposure to lawsuits. Until recently, this has been unlikely because references
played such a significant role in the evaluation and hiring of
prospective applicants, 7 but employers should begin to recognize that even furnishing accurate information may be grounds
for a cause of action under section 704(a) after Robinson."
Employers provide references expecting reciprocation from other
employers to assist in evaluating candidatesY 9 Employers already face exposure to liability for defamation for providing
references, but the expansive interpretation of section 704(a)
further extends this potential liability.' It is likely that increased exposure will significantly undermine the benefit of
references because employers will become less willing to provide
details about an employee's work history and more inclined to
disclose only basic information such as dates of employment."4 As references become more one-dimensional, and consequently less helpful in evaluating candidates, while at the
same time exposing the employer to increased liability, it would
not be surprising to see them fall into disfavor and even extinc-

237. See
the Demise
238. See
239. See

Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, Employer (r)Rationality and
of Employment References, 30 AM. Bus. L. J. 123, 124 (1992).
infra notes 242-54 and accompanying text.
Tafuri, supra note 19, at 822-23.

240. See id.
241. See Valerie L. Acoff, Note, References Available Upon Request...
Not!-Employers are Being Sued for Providing Employee Job References, 17 AM. J.
TRIAL AnVoc. 755 (1994).
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tion. Additionally, an increased burden on employers to defend
retaliation claims is also more likely.
The facts of Robinson illustrate the difficulties inherent in an
employer's duty to defend multiple Title VII claims stemming
from its relationship with a single employee. Robinson alleged
that he was terminated from Shell Oil Company in 1991 because of his race.' He subsequently filed charges of racial
discrimination with the EEOC.' Robinson alleged that Shell
retaliated against him for his EEOC filing by providing a negative reference. The action for discriminatory termination proceeded to a bench trial and the district court entered judgment
in favor of Shell. Robinson, however, continued to press his
retaliation claim. Shell asserted that it gave Robinson a negative reference, but one that was truthful and accurately reflected Robinson's performance as a Shell employee.'" Shell also
contended that as a part of the discrimination trial it put into
evidence the reasons for Robinson's termination which included
poor attendance and below average performance.' Shell argued that the district court accepted its articulated nondiscriminatory reasons for firing Robinson and that it had already successfully litigated these issues.' Thus, in the retaliation action Shell was in a position of relitigating the basis 'for
Robinson's termination, proving again that its evaluation of his
performance was valid, and that its disclosure to Metropolitan
was truthful and lacked an intent to retaliate. This burdensome
duty to defend is recurrent in many of the cases previously discussed.

242. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct.

843 (1997).
243. See id. at 327.
244. See Respondent's Brief at *30, Robinson, No. 95-1376, 1996 WL 419672 (U.S.
July 25, 1996).
245. See id. (arguing that Shell already proved that Robinson performed below average in his: "performance of duties, ability to work harmoniously with others, ability
to work conscientiously and for long hours away from close supervision, sincerity and
integrity, moral habits, ability to live within his means or meet his obligations, judgment and quick thinking abilities, trustworthiness in handling money, and effective-

ness in making sales").
246. See id There was no appeal of the discriminatory discharge case.
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In Bailey v. USX Corp.,247 the plaintiff also filed a cause of

action alleging discriminatory termination." While that action
was pending, Bailey received an unfavorable reference from
USX and fied a subsequent action for retaliation. 9 Bailey
lost the discrimination claim and did not appeal that decision.Y° Yet, USX was forced to defend Bailey's second claim
which also was ultimately dismissed. Likewise, in Charlton v.
4 the plaintiff claimed discrimiParamus Board of Education,"
nation resulted in her discharge. 2 Her discrimination claims
were ultimately dismissed.' Her retaliation claim was also
dismissed by the district court because she was not an employee at the time of the alleged retaliatory conduct, but was remanded by the Third Circuit under an expanded definition of
section 704(a). The school board had to defend a retaliation
claim even though it had validly discharged Charlton. 4 These
247. 850 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1988).
248. See id. at 1507.
249. See id. at 1508. Bailey's supervisor at USX advised the prospective employer
that "he thought Bailey was 'unproductive! and would not be rehired by USK." Id.
250. See id. Bailey's discrimination action was dismissed on defendant's motion at
the close of plaintiffs case. See id.
251. 25 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 1994).
252. See id. at 195-97.
253. The school board initiated tenure revocation proceedings against Charlton,
which ultimately resulted in her termination. See id. at 196. A review by a state
administrative board affirmed the school board's decision, and the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed the decision of the review board. The New Jersey Supreme Court
denied Charlton's petition for certification. See id. Charlton filed a federal lawsuit
alleging discrimination, which was dismissed by the district court and subsequently
affirmed by the Third Circuit.
254. See id. Accord EEOC v. J.M. Huber Corp., 927 F.2d 1322, 1324 (5th Cir.
1991). In J.M. Huber Corp., the plaintiff filed charges with the EEOC alleging racial
discrimination in her termination. Huber withheld finds that it had paid into the
plaintiffs qualified employee benefit plan, pursuant to its policy of withholding such
funds for any employee that challenged termination (for any reason). The EEOC issued a determination that there was no reasonable cause to believe that the
plaintiffs termination resulted from racial discrimination and the plaintiff did not
seek an administrative review of this determination or file suit in federal court. See
id. at 1324 & n.4. The EEOC, however, filed suit alleging that Huber's withholding of
funds constituted retaliation for plaintiffs initial filing of discrimination charges.
Huber released the funds after the EEOC's determination on the original charges, but
the EEOC pressed the claim for interest on the funds from the time that they were
withheld by Huber until they were released to the plaintiff. The Fifth Circuit ultimately concluded that Huber's withholding was properly motivated by ERISA regulations and did not amount to a per se violation of Title VII's anti-retaliation language (as the district court had previously found). See id. at 1330. Nonetheless,
Huber had to defend the Title VII retaliation claim by a former employee, even
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examples demonstrate the increased burden that is likely to
rest on a significant number of defendants under the expansion
of section 704(a) coverage.
It is possible for an employer to retaliate against an ex-employee, even though it did not initially discriminate in discharging her. In Rutherford, for example, the former employee initially brought an action alleging sex discrimination. 5 A trial
on the merits resulted in a verdict for Rutherford's former employer and was affirmed on appeal. 6 The employer was, however, held liable in a subsequent suit for retaliating against
Rutherford by informing a prospective employer that she had
filed the earlier Title VII lawsuit.27
The plight of employers, especially those historically engaging
in discriminatory practices, does not evoke a great deal of sympathy. The duty to defend, however, should be weighed every
time a new substantive right is imposed on any class of defendants. In the case of former employees, who already enjoy a
panoply of state and federal protection, an employer should not
be forced to relitigate the validity of its evaluations through
multiple Title VII actions. This opportunity presents extreme
difficulty for the former employer of a litigious former employee
who can challenge future references into infinity. Remembering
that an employer's refusal to provide a reference may also form
the basis of a section 704(a) retaliation claim, the employer sits
in an unenviable position somewhere between a rock and a
hard place. The duty to defend should not be a bar to providing
protection for former employees, but it holds particular significance where the judicial extension of section 704(a) merely adds
a duplicative remedy in most instances. Expanding section
704(a) adds a layer to the patchwork of employee protections,
without providing a truly comprehensive remedy." It is a du-

though it properly discharged the employee and complied with ERISA requirements.
255. See Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162, 1163 (10th

Cir. 1977).
256. See id.
257. See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text (discussing alternative analysis
of Rutherford and suggesting the court needlessly expanded section 704(a) in that

instance).
258. But see Barna, supra note 21, at 268 n.55 (arguing that section 704(a) should
be extended to cover former employees and "serve as a catch-all provision" that will
ensure former employees a federal remedy, rather than the state common-law alterna-

520

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:473

ty that, if imposed at all, should have been imposed after careful balancing by Congress and not by the Court.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The language used to define the class of individuals protected
from discrimination in section 704(a) is not ambiguous. Title
VII defines an employee as a person "employed by an
employer." 59 Section 704(a) coverage is limited to "his employees and applicants for employment" referring unambiguously to
the covered employer's current employees and applicants."
Although "employee" is used inconsistently throughout Title VII,
and is open to semantic manipulation, its context in section
704(a) has a plain and unambiguous meaning that requires
covered persons to have an existing employment relationship
with the covered employer. The Robinson Court created ambiguity by looking at the semantic variations which are plausible under section 704(a) rather than limiting its inquiry to the
plain meaning of Congress' words. The Court gave short shrift
to Congress' limitation and its choice to expand coverage to
expressly include "applicants for employment" but not other individuals. Merely defining a protected class to include some
individuals while excluding others is not in and of itself absurd.
Moreover, even though section 704(a) has been construed to
include former employees the retaliation coverage is far from
the comprehensive panacea touted by the proponents of extended coverage. Many employees and employers remain outside its
scope, as many continue to remain outside the scope of section
703's substantive protection from race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin discrimination.
Furthermore, excluding former employees from the scope of
section 704(a) is not at odds with Title VII's underlying purpose
or remedial framework. Despite its breadth, there is no indication that Congress contemplated or attempted to provide an
implicit cause of action for former employees. It is obvious from
more recent legislation that Congress is keenly aware of the

tives).
259. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994).
260. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
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various stages of employment relationships and that it can use
express language to include former employees. Yet, amendments
to Title VII have made no effort to expand section 704(a) or
expressly include former employees.
Although Title VII enforcement relies on individual reporting,
failure to include former employees in the anti-retaliation provision would not chill enforcement efforts. While inclusion of
former employees would create a federal remedy for many retaliation claims, other avenues exist to protect former employees.
Moreover, most cases that extended section 704(a) coverage to
former employees, could have been effectively resolved by these
other remedies. Additionally, coverage of former employees is
inconsistent with Title Vi's relatively short limitations period.
It is clear that Congress did not envision this type of openended liability after creating a structured and narrow limitations period for filing charges and subsequent civil actions.
This note has attempted to paint an accurate picture of the
implications of expanding section 704(a)'s scope in the context
of Title VII enforcement. There are certainly good arguments
that former employees should enjoy protection under Title VII,
but terms in section 704(a) should also be read by their plain
meaning. Policy weighs both pro and con, and absent Congress'
express coverage of former employees the Court should have
resisted the temptation to judicially amend Title VII and augment its scope beyond Congress' contemplation. Robinson may
reflect the policy choices of the Supreme Court, but does not so
clearly represent those of Congress.

Barry T. Meek*
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